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Here as always the theory itself sets
the framework for its interpretation.
Everett (1957)
Introduction
Philosophers of science spend a lot of time “interpreting” scientific theories. In this
paper, I try to get a handle onwhat it is theymight be up to. Mymain contention is that
a certain picture of interpretation is widespread (though implicit) in contemporary
philosophy of science: a picture according to which interpretation of theories is
relevantly analogous to the interpretation of foreign literature. On this picture, which
wemight call the external account of theory-interpretation, meaning is to be imported
into the equations by putting them in correspondence with some discourse whose
signs and symbols are already endowed with significance. Of course, the prevalence
of this picture wouldn’t be much of a problem if that picture were the only way to
think about interpretation, or was clearly the best way to do so (though even then,
there would be a value to bringing it out into the light). I contend, however, that it
is neither. There is an alternative way of thinking about interpretation—what we can
call the “internal” account of interpretation—which instead takes interpretation to be
a matter of delineating a theory’s internal semantic architecture. At a minimum, I
hope to convince you the internal picture highlights an aspect of interpretation that
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we are otherwise at risk of neglecting. But I also aim to show that the internal picture
offers a richer and more satisfying account of interpretation than the external picture
does.
The paper proceeds as follows. I start (section 1) by assembling various platitudes
about what interpretation is for, so that we can get a bead on the notion we are after.
Section 2 outlines the external account of interpretation in more detail, looking in
particular at three examples of the form: the reductionist approach to interpretation
found in Carnap’s Aufbau, the quest for primitive ontology in quantum mechanics,
and the interpretation of physics by metaphysics. I take a slight step back in section 3,
to explore the question of what it is we are interpreting—that is, what I am taking
a “theory” (prior to interpretation) to be. This lays the groundwork for the internal
account of interpretation, which I give in section 4. Section 5 extends the internal
account to discuss inter-theoretic relations; and section 6 confronts the issue of how
interpretation relates to representation.
1 The role of interpretation
In order to assess what interpretation is, it is well to begin by considering what
interpretation does. That is, we should ask what role the notion of interpretation is
supposed to play in our scientific and philosophical practice. Having done so, we can
then look at whether such-and-such an account of what interpretation involves does,
in fact, describe an activity that instantiates that role.
First, interpreting a theory is a necessary component of determining the theory’s
commitments, both ontological and ideological. An uninterpreted theory is just that:
a symbolic calculus, with (perhaps) rules governing how the elements of the calculus
may be manipulated, but with no indication of how the calculus is of any greater
representational significance than a game of Go. So an uninterpreted theory is not
the sort of thing which is apt to be the subject of doxastic attitudes. If it was uniquely
determined what commitments would be involved, in the event that one takes the
realist plunge and decides to believe a theory, then we could perhaps claim that
the mere application of such a calculus is sufficient to “count” as taking on those
commitments. But at least prima facie, there are choices over how a given formal
calculus ought to be interpreted.1 Maybe, after analysis, we will succeed in showing
that there is no such multiplicity of interpretative options—but doing so will only be
1cf. Jones (1991).
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possible after the application of some philosophically rich account of interpretation,
so we are still required to develop such an account.
Second, for this reason, the notion of interpretation is crucial in explicating (certain
forms of) the realist-antirealist debate.2 To be a realist about some scientific theory
is a commitment to the (approximate) truth of the theory,3 and to be committed to
the truth of those statements under a realistic semantics for theoretical terms.4 The
first factor commits the realist to interpretation as a process or project. If the theory’s
statements are to be asserted, and asserted as true, then the realist cannot rest content
with uninterpreted or partially interpreted theories: for uninterpreted sentences are
not the sort of thing that can be true (or false). The second factor is a constraint
on what kind of interpretation the realist can accept (i.e., one which gives a realistic
semantics—whatever that might mean).
Similarly, anti-realists may characterised by their attitudes towards how best to
interpret theories (or whether to interpret theories at all). The reductive empiricist
is also required to interpret theories; they merely disagree with the realist over what
kind of interpretation is appropriate. And there are good reasons for the constructive
empiricist to care about interpretation, since they take the provision of a realistic
semantics to be part and parcel of presenting a theory for acceptance. Only quietists
are marked out as those who think that scientific theories ought not to be interpreted
at all; and even then, they will presumably think that the observational parts of a
theory require interpretation, at least if the theory is to be tested or used. Thus,
attitudes towards thepractice of interpretation (compulsory vs. supererogatory vs. ill-
advised), and towards what kinds of interpretation that practice should seek (realistic
vs. deviant), are one of theways inwhich different positions in the debate over realism
distinguish themselves from one another.
Third, the notionof interpretation is not only ameans ofmarking territorywithin the
realism debate; it also bears upon the dialectic of that debate. For consider the virtues
which, the realist contends, are such as to warrant a (truth-based) commitment to a
scientific theory: explanatory power, unificatory strength, etc. Put aside the issue of
whether these virtues do indeedwarrant such a commitment, and insteadmerely note
2cf. Stanford (nd).
3Unlike constructive empiricists, who maintain that acceptance of a theory as empirically adequate is
sufficient to licence its assertion.
4Unlike reductive empiricists—such as instrumentalists—whomay acknowledge the truth of scientific
claims, but only because such claims are understood as “secretly” being claims about observable
entities.
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that these are virtues of interpreted theories.5 So not only is interpretation important
for understanding realism, it is also a precondition of the plausibility of realism. Without
interpretation, theories simply would not have the kinds of features which the realist
takes as justifications for the realist attitude.
Finally, there is a close relationship between equivalence and interpretation (a rela-
tionship which will be of much concern to us in this paper). The heart of the notion
of theoretical equivalence is a certain sort of ecumenicism with regards to equivalent
theories: if theories A and B are equivalent, then there is no question about which
of them one ought to commit oneself to, since advocating the one induces the same
commitments as advocating the other. This is why determinations of equivalence are
interesting and important, since they will tell us when we do or don’t need to make
choices amongst theories. But it also makes clear that interpretation and equivalence
are closely associated notions: for a pair of uninterpreted theories, there is no sense
to be made of the question of whether or not they are equivalent, since (as discussed
above) they do not have unambiguous rosters of commitments.
2 The external approach to interpretation
So what kind of practice could interpretation be, which would have the effects con-
sidered above? In this section, I want to articulate and critique one answer to this
question, which is popular but—I contend—flawed. This is the “external” account
sketched above, which takes the interpretation of a theory to be, in some relevant
sense, analogous to the interpretation of a passage written in a foreign language.
“Interpreting” such a passage is a matter of translating it into the home language,
and thereby coming to understand the passage by dint of one’s facility with the home
language. The analogous move, in the case of scientific theories, is to exploit some
antecedent semantic facility in order to come to understand (i.e., to interpret) the
target theory. This is all very vague; with luck, the following examples will help spell
out the phenomenon I have in mind.
First, consider attempts to reduce scientific (and ordinary) discourse to a phe-
nomenological basis: for example, Russell’s project in Our Knowledge of the External
World (Russell, 1993). Russell is motivated by epistemic considerations, in particular
a concern to ward off skeptical doubt:
We are thus led to a distinction between what wemay call “hard” data and
5I take this observation from Ruetsche (2011, Chapter 1).
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“soft” data. [. . . ] I mean by “hard” data those which resist the solvent
influence of critical reflection, and by “soft” data those which, under the
operation of this process, become to our minds more or less doubtful. The
hardest of hard data are of two sorts: the particular facts of sense, and the
general truths of logic.6
If it is only the immediate objects of sensory experience and the truths of logic that
enjoy primitive epistemic privilege, then (claims Russell) the only way for science to
enjoy that same privilege is if the objects of science are, in fact, logical constructs from
the objects of sense: “it may be laid down quite generally that in so far as physics
or common sense is verifiable, it must be capable of interpretation in terms of actual
sense-data alone.”7
We need not be concerned with this (rather dubious) epistemic motivation for the
project. Rather, we should be interested in the project itself: specifically, Russell’s
characterisation of it as providing an interpretation in terms of sense-data. So although
the reductionist process has in mind an epistemic goal, the goal is to be accomplished
by semantic means, by providing a certain sort of account of what the theory is
about. In Russell’s hands, it doesn’t seem to be a requirement on the coherence or
intelligibility of a theory that it be cashed out into the currency of experience—merely
a requirement on its knowability. But it would not take long for the means and ends of
such reductionism to be brought together. After readingOur Knowledge of the External
World in 1921, Carnap was inspired to undertake his own version of the reductionist
project, culminating in 1928’s Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (Carnap, 1967).
As with Russell, the overall project is to show how all the objects of science may
be constructed from the “autopsychological” basis of first-personal experience. This
basis is comprised of “erlebs”, primitive and elementary such experiences, standing in
relations of recollected similarity; from these austere ingredients, we are to construct
first the world of physical objects, then the “heteropsychological” world of third-
personal mental configurations, and finally the world of sociocultural institutions.
Unlike Russell, however, the core motivation for such a construction is not (or at least,
not only) that of showing how our knowledge of the constructed world derives from
our knowledge of the constructive basis. There is now a further notion that this
will show how the meaning of discourse concerning the constructed world is cooked
up out of the meaningfulness of terms regarding the basis. As Carnap put it in an
6Russell (1993, pp. 77–78)
7Russell (1993, pp. 88–89)
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unpublished lecture,
Quite generally, everything that we talk about must be reducible to what
I have experienced. Everything that I can know refers either to my own
feelings, representations, thoughts and so forth, or it is to be inferred
from my perceptions. Each meaningful assertion, whether it concerns
remote objects or complicated scientific concepts, must be translatable into
a statement that speaks about contents of my own experience and, indeed,
at most about my perceptions.8
So what we have here is a particular story about where meaning comes from,
informing and underpinning a particular way of imbuing theories with content. Ac-
cording to this story, meaning flows in the first instance from experience; and so, the
ultimate topic of all meaningful (interpreted) discourse must be sensory experience
itself. So we see an intimate relationship between the positivist or empiricist account
of meaning, and the associated conception of what is involved in interpreting a the-
ory. Note that this work of Carnap’s, and the broader positivist program of which
it is a part, exemplifies the connections we canvassed in section 1 above between in-
terpretation, commitment, and equivalence. A theory’s true commitments are, it is
suggested, exhausted by the claims it makes about what is observable (identified, in
the positivist program, with the claims statable in the observation-language).9 And
what it is for two theories to be equivalent is just for them to have the same obser-
vational consequences: empirical equivalence is a sufficient condition for theoretical
equivalence.10
(A brief digression: there are subtleties about the extent to which a project such as
Russell’s or Carnap’s is really best understood as translation into another language,
except in a very broadly analogous sense.11 At least on some accounts, sense-data
or erlebs are objects with intrinsic semantic content, insofar as grasping the inherent
properties of such an object is simply what it is to manifest a thought of the relevant
associated kind; languages, by contrast, are symbolic systemswhose semantic content
arises from their relation to other objects, not from intrinsic or inherent features of the
elements of the system themselves. That said, I think the analogy is robust enough
8(Carnap, 1929, p. 12); quoted and translated in (Coffa, 1991, p. 227).
9Hence the significance of Craig’s theorem, insofar as it was taken to show that one could find a
recursively axiomatisable theory capturing just the “observational content” of any other theory (see
Craig (1953), or Putnam (1965) for critical discussion).
10See e.g. Reichenbach (1938), or Putnam (1983) for a critique.
11I thank Erik Curiel for pressing me on this.
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that my criticisms of the external approach do carry over—indeed, it seems to me that
the claimed difference between the autopsychological basis and (other) languages (on
the grounds that the former, but not the latter, are endowed with intrinsic semantic
content) is exactly what is at issue. If I’m wrong about this, however, then one can
just take my arguments to apply to a version of these phenomenological reduction-
projects, where the process of reduction is thought of as a form of translation in some
more robust sense than that envisioned by Russell or Carnap.)
Actually carrying out a project such as Carnap’s, however, turns out to be fraught
with difficulties. The main problem is that scientific discourse does not, in general,
associate to each concept it employs a distinctive or canonical class of observable “in-
dicators”, or “criteria”, or “verification-conditions”; and even in the (rather artificial)
cases where such indicators are to be had, there may be further barriers to uniquely
associating indicators with purely phenomenological data. For example, radioactive
decay may, under appropriate circumstances, be associated with the clicking of a
Geiger counter: but it is not always so associated (not even in all experimental con-
texts where radiation is successfully detected), and it is hard to spell out “the clicking
of a Geiger counter” in terms of pure autopsychology. It should be emphasised that
the post-Aufbau Carnap was well aware of these problems; they were a significant
motivation for the replacement of explicit definition by reduction sentences or corre-
spondence rules. Even these liberalised versions of the doctrine, however, still take for
granted that interpretation of a theory is amatter of relating it to an external empirical
basis.
At the same time, the popularity of the epistemic or semantic theses motivating
these projects has severely waned. Claims that we only “really” have knowledge of
that with which we are immediately acquainted, or that we only “really” understand
claims about the immediate contents of experience, are (forwhatever reason) nowhere
near as widespread as they once were. However, this doesn’t mean that the external
approach to interpretation has gone away—just that it takes a different form. As a
second example, consider the primitive-ontology approach to quantum mechanics.
Advocates of this approach often stress the problems with explicating a theory’s
(empirical) content in terms of its phenomenological implications.12 Nevertheless,
there is an important continuity. Maudlin’s account of the relationship between the
two approaches is exemplary, and worth quoting at length:
12Dialectically, this is because such explications are often associated with Copenhagen-style interpre-
tations of quantum theory, of the kind which primitive ontology seeks to oppose.
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There was a reasonable concern behind all this foolery [i.e., the project
of reducing physics to phenomenalist terms]. In order to be of interest,
physical theories have to make contact with some sort of evidence, some
grounds for taking them seriously or dismissing them. And the acquisition
of evidence by humans clearly does involve experience at some point. So
it is not surprising that one might focus on how physical claims relate to
experience in an attempt to get a handle on the problem of evidence. But
for all that, it turns out to be thewrong handle to grasp since the connection
between physical descriptions and experience has never beenmade precise
enough to admit analysis.
Rather, in classical physics the evidential connection is made between the
physical description and a certain class of local beables, such as the positions
of macroscopic objects. [. . . ] Our ability to reliably observe such facts
[i.e., facts about the local beables] is not itself derived from the physics:
it is rather a presupposition used in testing the physics. So the contact
between theory and evidence is made exactly at the point of some local
beables: beables that are predictable according to the theory and intuitively
observable as well.
The pre-theoretical intuition that certain physical states of affairs are un-
problematically observable is not couched in the terminology of a physical
theory: it is couched in everyday language. If Galileo drops rocks off the
Leaning Tower, what is important is that we accept that it is observable
when the rocks hit the ground. If the physical theory itself asserts that rocks
are made up of atoms, then it will follow according to the theory together
with intuition that we can observe when certain collections of atoms hit the
ground, but this latter is clearly not the content of the observation. If the
theory says instead that rocks are composed of fields, then it will follow
that we can observe when certain fields hit the ground, or when the field
values near the ground become high. It is easy enough to see how to
translate the claim that we can see the rocks into the proprietary language
of atomic physics or continuummechanics or string theory. But the critical
point is that the principles of translation are extremely easy and straightforward
when the connection is made via the local beables of the theory. Collections
of atoms or regions of strong field or regions of high mass density, be-
cause they are local beables, can unproblematically be rock-shaped and
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move in reasonably precise trajectories. If the theory says that this is what
rocks really are, then we know how to translate the observable phenomena
into the language of the theory, and so make contact with the theoretical
predictions.13
Let’s count the steps here. First, there is the claim that the empirical content
of a theory is better identified with its implications for the behaviour of macroscopic
objects, rather than its implications for sense-experience. Then follows the observation
that we already have a language for talking about such objects: namely, English (or
French, or Chinese, or whatever). So to pick out the implications of the theory for such
objects is—perhaps inter alia—to put certain terms of the theory into correspondence
with certain terms in English (or whatever). This idea is well taken, and we will
return to it in §4 below. Second, there is the observation that this correspondence is
reasonably straightforward when the theory contains designated local beables. For,
given the local beables, we may give a straightforwardly mereological account of how
to accomplish this correspondence: if rocks, tables, etc., are composed of the local
beables, then “rock” is just translated as “rock-shaped collections of local beables”.
Where the external approach comes in, however, is in the conclusion drawn from
these claims: that the local-beables portion of the theory’s language acquires meaning
by being translated into ordinary English, with the rest of the theory then acquiring
meaning from its implications for the behaviour of those beables—and hence, pos-
sessing meaning only insofar as it has implications for those beables. Thus Dürr,
Goldstein and Zanghí write:
According to (pre-quantum-mechanical) scientific precedent, when new
mathematically abstract theoretical entities are introduced into a theory,
the physical significance of these entities, their very meaning insofar as
physics is concerned, arises from their dynamical role, from the role they
play in (governing) the evolution of the more primitive—more familiar
and less abstract—entities or dynamical variables. For example, in classi-
cal electrodynamics themeaning of the electromagnetic field derives solely
from the Lorentz force equation, i.e., from the field’s role in governing
the evolution of the positions of charged particles, through the specifi-
cation of the forces, acting upon these particles, to which the field gives
rise; while in general relativity a similar statement can be made for the
13(Maudlin, 2007b, p. 3158–3159)
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gravitational metric tensor. That this should be so is rather obvious: Why
would these abstractions be introduced in the first place, if not for their
relevance to the behavior of something else, which somehow already has
physical significance?14
The result of all this is that for theories without local beables, there is no interpreta-
tive project available. If a theory does not posit a “primitive ontology” of local beables,
then it is uninterpretable, since there is nothing to be translated into English. So the
primitive ontology plays a privileged role in investing the theory with content: “the
fundamental requisite of the [primitive ontology] is that it should make absolutely
precise what the theory is fundamentally about”;15 “ignoring [the primitive ontology
of particle positions in Bohmian mechanics], the theory becomes a theory about noth-
ing”;16 “in a particle theory, [. . . ] particle positions are what the theory is about. The
role of all other variables is to say how the positions change.”17 Thus, interpreting a
theory is a matter of identifying the primitive ontology of the theory (or providing it
with one, if none is forthcoming); the “extremely easy and straightforward” mereo-
logical translation into ordinary language then gives meaning to the claims the theory
makes about the primitive ontology, and thence to the theory as a whole. In other
words, we have here a project that is structurally very similar to the Russellian or
Carnapian project discussed above—only with the phenomenological basis replaced
by a basis of material objects in space and time.18
Again, we find a close-knit web of connections between interpretation, commitment
and equivalence. For example, Allori et al. (2008) “suggest that two theories be
regarded as physically equivalent when they lead to the same history of the PO
[primitive ontology]”.19 And an interesting recent trend in the primitive-ontology
literature is towards treating other aspects of a theory besides the primitive ontology—
such as thewavefunction or the electromagnetic fields—asnot fully part of the theory’s
14(Dürr et al., 1992, pp.848–849)
15Ghirardi (2016)
16(Dürr, 2008, p. 117); the context makes it reasonably clear that the claim generalises to other forms
of primitive ontology.
17(Dürr and Teufel, 2009, p. 38)
18In this connection, note that the Aufbau is more pluralist about the choice of basis than one might
expect. In particular, Carnap explicitly allows that one could use a physical basis (such as (§62)
that consisting of elementary material particles or spacetime points), rather than a psychological
one, and notes that such a system“would have the advantage that it uses as its basic domain the
only domain (namely, the physical) which is characterized by a clear regularity of its processes.”
(Carnap, 1967, §59)
19(Allori et al., 2008, p. 365)—although as discussed in n. 37 below, they also seem open to applying
the converse direction.
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commitments.20
Finally, I want to adduce one more example of the external approach—or rather,
not so much a specific example, as a suggestion that the external approach is implicit
in much of the practice of contemporary philosophy of science. I have in mind
the pervasive metaphor of interpretation as a matter of “picturing” our scientific
commitments—where providing such a picture is often understood as a matter of
giving the metaphysics to accompany the science. For example, Chakravartty holds
that
The neglect of metaphysics in the context of realism [. . . ] is a mistake.
For there is a sense in which the metaphysics of science is a precursor to
its epistemology. One cannot fully appreciate what it might mean to be
a realist until one has a clear picture of what one is being invited to be a
realist about.21
As discussed in the introduction, I am sympathetic to the claim that interpretation is a
precondition of measuring what commitments a realist is getting themselves into; but
here, that is coupled to an image of interpretation as the provision of a “picture”. Note
that this image of interpretation transcends divisions overwhat kind ofmetaphysics is
appropriate—it is a higher-level, more methodological, commitment than that. Thus
French, despite disagreeing stronglywithChakravartty overwhat kindofmetaphysics
scientific realismdemands, agrees that providing such ametaphysics is a precondition
for realism (and by extension, for interpretation):
In order to obtain Chakravartty’s clear picture and hence obtain an appro-
priate realist understanding of the world we need to clothe the physics in
an appropriate metaphysics. Those who reject any such need are either
closet empiricists or ersatz realists.22
This methodological stance then has implications for what kinds of projects are worth
pursuing in the philosophy of science, and how we should go about pursuing them.
For instance, I’ve stressed above that one characteristic feature of external interpreta-
tions is that they induce a criterion of equivalence: for two theories, or models of a
theory, or sentences of a theory (etc.) to be equivalent is for the external interpretation
to assign them the same content. Coffey (2014) has argued that this demonstrates,
20See e.g. Miller (2014), Callender (2014), Esfeld (2014), or Bhogal and Perry (2015).
21(Chakravartty, 2007, p.26)
22(French, 2013, p. 85)
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quite generally, that there is no interesting independent question of when two theories
are equivalent:
For those of us who think sense can be made of a theory’s physical con-
tent beyond what the theory says about the empirically confirmable or
disconfirmable—in short, for those of us who take the interpretive project
seriously in the philosophy of physics—there’s a natural and seemingly
simple account of theoretical equivalence [. . . ]:
Two theoretical formulations are theoretically equivalent exactly
if they say the same thing about what the physical world is like,
where that content goes well beyond their observable or empiri-
cal claims. Theoretical equivalence is a functionof interpretation.
It’s a relation between completely interpreted formulations.
Insofar as we can understand the physical pictures provided by different
interpreted formalisms, and insofar as we’re capable of comparing those
pictures, we can straightforwardly determine whether two interpreted
formulations are theoretically equivalent, whether they say the same thing
about what the physical world is like.23
I think Coffey is essentially correct here: on the external account, there is little that
can be independently said about equivalence. However, as we’ll see, I take this to be
an artefact of that account, rather than an indication that inquiries into conditions of
equivalence are misdirected.
We now have enough examples to make clear the overall character of the external
approach—and my concerns about it. To my mind, there are two problems that are
especially pressing. First, since this approach involves pretheoretically privileging
some particular model of description, it gives rise to naturalist concerns. Insisting
that any acceptable theory must be translatable into the transparent idiom requires
imposing constraints on science which have been derived entirely (or almost entirely)
from a priori philosophical reflection. This concern becomes particularly acute when
the demand for transparency is used to direct or constrain the search for theories:
for instance, when primitive ontologists demand that any acceptable quantum theory
must take a certain form.24 We should be extremely skeptical that the reflections
23(Coffey, 2014, pp. 834–835)
24e.g. Egg and Esfeld (2014), Esfeld et al. (2014)
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of philosophers will offer a better mechanism for theory choice in science than the
practice of science does.
Second, there is a concern about circularity. We are confronted by a pair of theories
(say T1 and T2), and we inquire into what kind of relationship obtains between them:
whether they are equivalent, say, or whether one theory is some kind of limiting case
of the other. On the external approach, these questions should be deferred until after
the theories have been interpreted, i.e., until we have settled on an account of what the
theories say. But when we look at any specific such account, what form does it have?
Well, just somemore sentences—that is to say, just more theory!25 So the status of this
third theory—call it TI—as an interpretation of T1 or T2 depends on the propriety of
claiming that TI stands in some appropriate kind of relationship to T1 or T2. But of
course, articulating the conditions for such relationships to hold was exactly the task
with which we began. So whatever the virtues of introducing TI might be, it cannot
be the case that doing so obviates the need for articulating those conditions.
These observations suggest that the external approach puts the cart before the horse:
that the “rendering” of a theory into a particular language or framework is the end
of an interpretative analysis, rather than merely constituting it. Before I spell this
claim out in more detail, though, I want to take a bit of a step back, and consider just
what it is we’re interpreting. Since the internal account thinks of interpretation as a
matter of altering a theory’s internal structure, rather than in postulating connections
to external fixed points, it will behove us to say a little more about the structure of
theories.
3 What is the structure of a theory?
The standard take on this question holds that we have two available choices. We
can take a syntactic view of theories, according to which theories are comprised by
sets of sentences, formed and manipulated according to some appropriate formal
calculus. Or we can take a semantic view of theories, according to which theories
are composed of sets of models. In this section, I suggest that we need make no
such choice: rather, we should take a theory to comprise both syntactic and semantic
elements. Considering the sentences in isolation from the models, or the models in
25It’s in this sense that the internal approach to interpretation makes contact with better-known
doctrines under the “internal” label, such as Putnam’s internal realism.
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isolation from the sentences, will fail to capture everything of interest.26
Let’s consider an example theory. And let’s take about the simplest example pos-
sible: the theory of a single Newtonian particle. First, we have a pair of dynamical
variables: one independent variable of time, t, and one dependent variable of position,
x. Each of these ranges over a real-valued space. Let us use X to denote the range
of x, and T to denote the range of t. We also introduce a real-valued parameter m
to characterise the particle’s mass. Finally, we introduce a function V : X → R, to
represent the potential at various points in space (which we identify with the possible
locations of the particle). The content of the theory is then captured in the following
equation:
m
d2x
dt2
= −dV
dx
(1)
The sense in which this equation summarises the physics of such a particle is as
follows: any physically possible history for the particle is represented by a solution
of the equation. A solution, here, is a function f : T → X such that at every t ∈ T ,
the above equation is satisfied. For instance, in the case of a free particle (V = 0), all
solutions are those functions of the form
f(t) = at+ b (2)
for a, b ∈ R.
This theory, simple though it is, already illustrates the core features of theories that
will concern us in what follows. First, we introduce some kind of formal language:
in this case, the language is just that of ordinary differential equations. Second, we
stipulate the kinds of mathematical structures that will be put to representational
work, and the way in which they can make sentences of the language true or false: in
this case, the constructs are real-valued functions of one real argument, which may
satisfy or fail to satisfy those differential equations. Finally, some kind of conditions
(in the formal language) are specified, which those constructs may satisfy or fail to
satisfy: in this case, the differential equation (1). This serves to pick out some of the
constructs as privileged, i.e. those which do indeed satisfy the specified conditions:
in this case, the solutions (2) of (1).
Thus, our toy theory could be described as a set of syntactic conditions, together with
an account of the structures to which those conditions apply, and of what it would
be for them to be satisfied. It is for this reason that I take both the syntactic and
26In this, I follow Halvorson (2012), Halvorson (2013), and Lutz (2015).
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semantic views to be a poor fit for the actual character of theories, at least if those
views are taken at face value. I think it matters what semantic constructions are taken
to be the subject of the syntactic conditions; I certainly don’t want to require that
the theory’s content be specifiable in terms of some kind of purely syntactic proof-
procedure. Equally, it matters that the models of the theory are not an arbitrary set of
mathematical structures, but rather a set of structures satisfying some specific set of
conditions. Moreover, I am quite happy with the idea that these models are “yoked
to a particular syntax”:27 the spaces T and X are explicitly labelled (by the variables
t and x respectively), in order to make manifest how to assess whether the condition
(1) holds of a given function. (Although we will return to the issue of language-
independence in §5 below.) All this said, I don’t wish to rule out the notion that some
more subtle conception of the syntactic or semantic view is consistent with this way
of thinking about theories—indeed, I expect that one could render it consistent with
a sufficiently thoughtful version of either view.28 I merely wish to signal that it does
not, so far as I can see, coincide with thoughtless versions of either.
One traditional difficulty with relating the philosophical literature to the practice of
science is the former’s focus on theories formulated in terms of the first-order predicate
calculus, despite the paucity of such theories in scientific practice. At least within
physics, one is far more likely to come across laws that—as in the example above—
take the form of differential equations, governing how systems evolve over time, how
fields may be distributed over spacetime, etc.29 However, the differences between
first-order theories, and theories stated in terms of differential equations, should not
be overstated. In fact, there are a series of useful and illuminating analogies between
the two formalisms, which can guide us in how concepts from the one can be usefully
applied to the other—and which indicate that an account of interpretation should be
applicable to theories in either form.
To see this comparison, recall that a “theory” in first-order model theory is typically
taken to be a set of sentences of a specified first-order language. Such a language
may be identified with the set of well-formed formulae generated from a particular
signature (set of relation- and function-symbols) Σ, according to the recursive syntax
rules of the predicate calculus. That sounds a lot like the syntactic conception of
27(van Fraassen, 1989, p. 366)
28Some (highly defeasible) evidence for this claim: when describing this view, I have been told both
that it is clearly best thought of as an appropriately careful version of the semantic view, and (by
others) that it is clearly best thought of as an appropriately careful version of the syntactic view.
29cf. Maudlin (2007a).
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theories. But model theory, of course, is not interested in such sets of sentences in
isolation. Say that a Σ-theory is a set of sentences of signature Σ. Then a Σ-structure S
is a set S, equipped with “interpretations” of the elements of Σ (maps from relation-
symbols to relations over S, and from function-symbols to functions over S). S may
make Σ-sentences true or false via the standard Tarskian clauses. If a Σ-structure
M makes all the sentences of a Σ-theory T true, then M is said to be a model of
T; the class of all models of T is denoted Mod(T). So model theory, as the name
suggests, is interested in analysing the various relationships between sets of sentences
and their models.30 Hence, a theory in the sense of model theory exhibits the same
tripartite structure that we saw a moment ago. There is a specification of the kinds of
mathematical structures that will be used for representation (i.e. Σ-structures). There
is a collection of syntactically given conditions (i.e. T). There is a subclass of the
representational structures, privileged in virtue of fulfilling the stated conditions (i.e.
Mod(T)).
Furthermore, we can even see analogies between the intrinsic workings of the repre-
sentational structures in either case: we can think of a model of a first-order theory as
describing the distribution of certain properties and relations over a set of individuals,
and we can think of a model of the Newtonian theory as describing the distribution
of a monadic determinable property (position) over some set of individuals (particle-
stages).31 I take this to be prima facie evidence that the form I describe for theories
in general (a set of syntactic conditions governing some mathematical structures of
an appropriate type) is indeed an appropriately generic form for theories to take.
Hence, I will suppose that this kind of form is an appropriate target for our account
of interpretation. I now turn to giving that account.
4 Models and modality
So, suppose that we are presented with a theory in the form above (i.e., a theory
comprising both syntactic conditions and an appropriate model theory). The models
bestow truth-values on the sentences of the theory in some kind of appropriately
30I intend this to include relationships that hold between sets of sentences in virtue of their models:
for instance, the relation of logical equivalence (i.e., of having the same models).
31This exploiting the fact that T can equally well be thought of as representing time, or as representing
the instantaneous stages of a particle (along the lines of the “stage theory” defended by Sider
(1996)); it seems more natural to take such stages, rather than instants of time, to be the subject of
predication here.
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systematic way. However, in interpreting the theory, we need not take all of the
aspects of the theory to faithfully encode commitments required when believing the
theory. That is, a crucial feature of interpretation is that there is scope to treat some
aspects of the theory as (mere) artefacts. Thus, for example, the “facts” about which
specific coordinates an object occupies in a coordinate-based model of some physical
system are typically regarded as merely artefactual: accepting the theory from which
this model is taken does not mean accepting that there are genuine physical correlates
to such facts. Theproject of internal interpretation is exactly this separationof artefactual
and representational features in the theory’s models. To illustrate, let’s look at some
examples of doing so, in order to demonstrate how the separation can be done in a
suitably internal fashion.
First, consider the case of isomorphic models. At least if we are using standard
mathematical tools,32 models can be distinct whilst still being isomorphic: perhaps
one model has a domain comprising the natural numbers as its domain, whereas its
isomorphic cousin has the integers. But it has seemed plausible to many that we
should be sceptical that this distinction corresponds to any difference. For one thing,
this view gets motivation from “anti-haecceitist” doctrines, i.e., views which deny
that there are any metaphysically substantive facts about the “intrinsic identities” of
objects or individuals (above andbeyond their qualitativeprofiles).33 Since isomorphic
models agree on the distribution of qualitative properties, argues the anti-haecceitist,
they are representing the same possible world. Alternatively, or more generally, one
can also argue for the equivalence of isomorphic models from considerations about
the very nature of representation bymathematical structures. On this view, even if one
is a haecceitist, one should still interpret isomorphic models as representing the same
possible world—it’s just that one should include representatives of non-qualitative
properties in one’s models, so that models which are qualitatively isomorphic need
not be isomorphic tout court.34 Thus, debates about what we should take the content
of our theories to be, and over what kind of representational role certain aspects of
a theory might permissibly have, get cashed out in the question of whether or not
certain models of the theory ought to be regarded as equivalent.
As a second example, consider symmetries in physics: say, the gauge symmetry
of electromagnetism. Recall that this symmetry arises when the electromagnetic
32Rather than, say, homotopy type theory (see The Univalent Foundations Program (2013)).
33Kaplan (1975), Pooley (2006)
34This is how I understand Weatherall (2016)’s critique of the usual dialectic surrounding the “Hole
Argument”.
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potential is characterised as a 1-form Aa on (say) Minkowski spaceM . The equations
of the theory are invariant under the transformation
Aa 7→ Aa +∇aΛ (3)
where Λ is any smooth scalar function and ∇a is the derivative associated with the
Minkowskimetric. As a result, given anymodel (solution) of the theory, we can obtain
another solution by transforming Aa as in (3).
Generally, gauge-related models are understood as physically equivalent to one
another.35 However, it is controversial whether this means that such models can be
interpreted as equivalent (so that someone could continue to use the original theory
whilst affirming that gauge-related models are equivalent), or whether this is merely
a way of saying that we ought to seek some alternative theory in which themodels are
isomorphic (or even identical).36 Again, therefore, a dispute about interpretation gets
parlayed into a dispute about whether certain kinds of models should be regarded as
equivalent to one another.
So the internal approach holds that we should, in general, understand interpretive
disputes as disputes over what kinds of equivalences hold amongst the models of
a theory. That is, in interpreting a theory, we begin by making determinations of
equivalence, and use those determinations to get a fix on the theory’s commitments.
We do this by employing the following principle, the converse of Coffey’s: the theory
is committed to whatever is invariant across equivalences, i.e., to all and only that
which is shared by equivalent models.37 Thus, on the internal view, interpreting a
theory is a matter of postulating certain equivalences between elements of the model
theory, abstracting away from the differences between the (declared-to-be) equivalent
models.
I nowwant to defend a further claim about the results of this process of abstraction:
namely that, at least for theories regarded as describing the world (on which more
below), these results are naturally understood as possible worlds (“possible”, that is,
in the sense of being nomologically possible relative to taking the claims of the theory
35Exactly why we should do so is a matter of some dispute: see e.g. Saunders (2003), Roberts (2008),
Baker (2010), Dasgupta (2014), Caulton (2015), and references therein.
36See Dewar (2015), Møller-Nielsen (nd), Dewar (nd) for discussion.
37It should be noted that Allori et al. (2008) are sympathetic to such an idea. The quotation given in
§2 above continues, “Conversely, one could define the notion of PO [primitive ontology] in terms
of physical equivalence: The PO is described by those variables that remain invariant under all
physical equivalences.” (Allori et al., 2008, p. 365)
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as laws). This expresses the fact that we generally explicate theory-relative possibility
by looking to what sorts of things are true in some model or other of the theory. Is
it possible, according to General Relativity, that black holes exist? Yes, because there
are models of the theory according to which black holes exist. Is it possible, according
to quantum mechanics, for a particle to simultaneously occupy an eigenstate of the
position and momentum operators? No, because there is no model of the theory
in which that is the case. But we do not straightforwardly associate models with
possibilities, in a one-to-one fashion. Diffeomorphic models of General Relativity are
standardly taken to represent the samepossibility, as are a correspondingpair ofwave-
mechanical and matrix-mechanical models of quantum mechanics. So we should not
identify the possible worlds with the models themselves, but rather with the results
of abstracting from the models by the equivalence relation postulated in interpreting
the theory. This suggestion provides the standard link between interpretation and
modality: in an interpreted theory, equivalent models are those which represent the
same possible world. In contrast to the standard account, however, our grasp of the
possible worlds follows (or rather, is provided by) our postulation of the equivalence-
relations between models.38
A brief digression is in order here, regarding the history of modal semantics. The
view just describedmay remind the reader of Carnap’s proposal to explicate necessity
in termsof logical truth;39 and thismight sound like somethingof aproblem, given that
Carnap’s modal semantics are generally agreed to be problematic. More specifically,
Carnap proposes adopting the following convention for his necessity operator, N
(where “L-true” means “logically valid”):
For any sentence ‘. . . ’, ‘N(. . . )’ is true if and only if ‘. . . ’ is L-true.40
However, there are a few important differences. One is that Carnap is explicit that
this is intended as an analysis of logical necessity, not nomological necessity. As
such, Carnap’s proposal would correspond to the special case of the above scheme
38Despite its naturalness (especially, the way it meshes with the way working scientists tend to talk
of possibility), this view of possible worlds has not been very popular amongst metaphysicians.
Indeed, I am not sure that it has been explicitly defended. Its closest relative, so far as I am aware,
is the view Lewis describes as “pictorial ersatzism” (Lewis, 1986, §3.3), although even that is only
a partial match. (Which may be for the best, given that pictorial ersatzism seems to generally be
reckoned implausible: e.g. “[Pictorial ersatzism is] an odd, hybrid view that, I suspect, no one has
or ever will hold” (Bricker, 2006, p. 42); “pictorial ersatzism is a puzzling view, and may have no
actual adherents” (Nolan, 2015, p. 64).)
39Carnap (1956)
40(Carnap, 1956, p. 174)
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where the theory in question is the empty theory (so that the models of the theory
are all the pictures of the appropriate type). More significantly, however, Carnap
appears to propose this convention as a semantics for modal logic, i.e., as a means of
determining the validity or invalidity of modal inferences. For, he claims, the above
convention enables us to acclaim certain sentences of modal logic as L-true (or L-
false): if that convention, together with his conventions for non-modal logic,41 suffice
to determine the sentence as true (respectively, false), then the sentence in question is
L-true (respectively, L-false).
Here, I definitely part company from Carnap. The account of possible worlds given
here is intended to furnish us with a specific Kripke model, i.e., that in which the
worlds are the models of the associated theory. But attention to one Kripke model in
particular is not sufficient for correctly characterising the notion of validity in modal
logic, any more than attention to one Tarski picture is sufficient for characterising the
notion of validity in non-modal logic. It is for this reason that Carnap’s account of
validity inmodal logic is defective. For instance, it is a consequence of his analysis that
“Every sentence of the form ‘N. . . ’ is L-determinate [i.e., logically valid or logically
invalid].”42 This results from the fact that he is considering only one Kripke model K
(that in which the worlds are all and only the Tarski-models of first-order logic), and
identifies logical validity with truth in K, rather than truth in all Kripke models. So,
because P is true in some Tarski-models, ♦P is true in K, and so is held by Carnap
to be logically valid. This is not only implausible in itself, but has the consequence
that logical validity is not closed under uniform substitution:43 (Q∧¬Q) is false in all
Tarski-pictures, so ♦(Q ∧ ¬Q) is false in K, and hence is not logically invalid (indeed,
is logically invalid). The point is that a sentence such as ♦P is not true in virtue of
their form alone, or true independently of the meaning assigned to P : if P is assigned to a
necessarily false proposition, then ♦P is false.
Therefore, as an analysis of logical inference—of what inferences are good, or what
sentences valid, independently of the meanings of their terms—Carnap’s convention
is no good. However, this does not impugn its status as an analysis of which modal
sentences are true. Indeed, understood in those terms, it surely has to be correct:
what else could it be for a first-order sentence σ to be logically necessary than for it to
be logically valid, i.e., true in all Tarski-pictures? Consider the non-modal analogue.
41Which are the same as those used here, except that Carnap employs a substitutional account of
quantification.
42(Carnap, 1956, p. 175)
43I take this observation from (Williamson, 2013, §2.8).
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It would be a disaster to hold that there is some special Tarski picture, S, such that
a sentence is logically valid if and only if it is true in S. But there is, of course, no
problem with affirming that S is the correct representation of what the facts are, that
a sentence is (actually) true if and only if it is true in S. One obvious difference is
that the means by which we come to affirm S as a good representation of the actual
facts will presumably be empirical in nature, whereas the means by which we come to
affirmK as a good representation of the modal facts (concerning logical modality) are
not. But that should not be especially surprising. As empiricists are wont to remind
us, there is no obvious means by which we could gain empirical access to the modal
facts. One virtue of the analysis proposed here is that it is about the only means I can
imagine by which we could have any access to those facts at all.44
I will conclude this section by considering a final issue, which may have been
perturbing the reader. If it really is the case that the internal approach to interpretation
puts the postulation of equivalences prior to the possible worlds, then what kinds of
considerations are to be deployed in advocating one interpretation over another?
That is, what makes something a good interpretation or not? If the possible worlds are
somehow “there” prior to and independently of the process of interpretation, and if
the models of the theory are just in the business of representing those worlds, then
we could give a straightforward criterion for whether an interpretation is good or
not: it’s good just in case it judges two models to be equivalent exactly when they
represent the same possible world. But if the possible worlds are (in some sense)
constructions from an interpretation, then it looks as though all interpretations will
be on a par. If I have an interpretation you dislike, then you cannot charge me with
being mistaken about what the possible worlds are like. By definition, my possible
worlds (i.e., those appropriate to the modality associated to my interpretation of the
theory) are in line with my interpretation; just as your possible worlds are in line with
your interpretation. So what can you say to persuade me out of my interpretation?
The answer is that you can say exactly the sorts of things you would normally say
in criticising someone’s interpretation—just without the detour via metaphysically
robust possible worlds. For example, suppose that you think my interpretation is
too fine-grained: it takes some models as inequivalent (i.e., to represent distinct
44Not that such accesswill be full or complete: Williamsonobserves that there is no recursive procedure
by which one could determine what sentences are true or false in K (Williamson, 2013, §2.8). He
presents this as a further problem for Carnap’s analysis, since it means that first-order modal logic
would have no sound and complete axiomatisation. On the view here, however, it is not terribly
surprising—why expect that we could fully discover what all the modal facts are, even given a
definite criterion for what those facts are?
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possibilities), which you think should be taken as equivalent. Suppose further that
you think this for essentially epistemic reasons: on my interpretation there are certain
facts (those concerning which of the allegedly distinct possibilities is actual) that
would be in principle inaccessible to knowers in those possibilities. That’s still a
good argument against my interpretation! For, what interpretation one plumps for
affects what sentences will have determinate truth-values (in worlds governed by
the theory), and hence what kinds of arguments one thinks are worth having about
the theory. If you’re right in your epistemic argument, then I’m committed to there
being certain kinds of arguments that are worth having, but which cannot (even in
principle) be settled by appeal to empirical evidence. That’s a problem, though not
an insurmountable one. Perhaps the kinds of explanation that can be given in my
interpretation are better, or perhaps the ontology associated with it is somehow better
(e.g. it abides by a principle of local action).
Whatever the details, the point for our purposes is just that this kind of familiar back-
and-forth is not, so far as I can tell, improved by holding that we are arguing about
the nature of antecedently existing possible worlds. Indeed, doing so would seem
to merely add to the mystery. Why think that these worlds are never epistemically
distinguishable? Or that their ontologies are especially intelligible? It’s reasonably
easy to think of pragmatic virtues for interpretations which are epistemically or ex-
planatorily well-behaved, or which involve more readily intelligible ontologies. But
that suggests that some more deflationary account of possible worlds fits better with
making sense of disagreements over the best interpretation. It opens up the space
for pragmatic virtues to be decisive in anointing one interpretation as “best”, without
being crowded out by the simple virtue of being right or wrong.
5 Internal inter-theoretic relations
So, this is how the internal approach characterises the project of interpreting a given
theory: as one of elaborating its internal networks of synonymy and equivalence.
However, it should be clear that this process (at least, taken naively) cannot be all
there is to interpretation. After all, there are plenty of cases where we have theories
whose internal structures are identical, and yet which—as we say—ought to receive
different interpretations. To take a well-worn example, the mathematics of a simple
harmonic oscillator may be used to represent small pendulums, or masses on springs,
or vibrating strings, or individual modes of electromagnetic radiation, or inductive
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electric circuits, or many others besides. So in comparing (say) the theory of amass on
a spring and that of an inductive electric circuit, paying attention only to their internal
structure would lead one to the conclusion that they are equivalent theories; only by
attending to the relationships those theories bear to the world can we recognise the
representational difference between them.
Well, so you might think. However, it seems to me that there is a way in which the
internalist can make sense of the distinctions between these theories, without making
primitive use of notions like representation or reference. (In the next section, I’ll
discuss in more detail where such notions could come in.) The solution is to think of
inter-theoretic relations in a particular way: namely, as intra-theoretic relations. To
see this, it is helpful to focus upon the role that such judgments play in our scientific
practice.
Let’s take a (super-simple) example. Suppose that you and I both write down
Maxwell’s equations—but whereas I use ρ to indicate charge density, you use µ. It
seems clear that we should judge the two theories to be equivalent. What is involved
in doing so? Simply that in speaking the combined vocabulary (that involving both ρ
and µ), certain kinds of inferences are licenced: for example, from
In this region, ρ vanishes.
we may infer
In this region, µ vanishes.
And of course, this generalises: any statement about ρ may equally well be phrased
as a statement about µ, since these are just two different notations for the same thing.
In other words, ifMµ is your version of Maxwell’s equations andMρ is mine, then the
proper combined theory is not justMµ ∪Mρ: rather, it isMµ ∪Mρ ∪ {µ = ρ}. Thus, it
is in the act of integrating two theories into a single theory that we can make use of a
judgment of equivalence.
Here, the formal relationship between the two theories was very clearly apt for
underwriting a judgment of equivalence. More generally, we might take the view
that if two theories are related by a systematic translation, then they may be taken
as equivalent: perhaps a translation that permits us to construct new predicates
and functions,45 or which permits us to construct new sorts and quantifiers,46 or
45i.e. definitional equivalence: see Glymour (1970), Barrett and Halvorson (2015a)
46i.e. so-calledMorita equivalence: see Barrett and Halvorson (2015b).
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which is a translation in some more general and abstract sense yet.47 This isn’t to
claim that any of these views on permissible varieties of translation are, or should
be, uncontroversial; rather, it is to claim that such controversies are important and
vital, precisely because they are a precondition to interpretation. Indeed, I think
many debates about the “richness” of the ontology we attribute to the world may
be perspicuously recast as debates about what criteria of translation are appropriate.
For example, fans of grounding or fundamentality may want to resist the idea that
definitional equivalence gives a good notion of translation: which terms are primitive
andwhich are defined, they could insist, encodes differing commitments about which
properties are fundamental andwhich are derivative.48 A larger audiencewill want to
resist the claim that Morita equivalence is a species of translation: that opens the way,
for instance, for mereological nihilism and universalism to collapse into one another.
So the acceptability of such criteria of equivalence is (paceCoffey) not a mere corollary
of the interpretive project, but rather an integral part of it. In particular, it seems to
me that the clearest way to be an ontological deflationist is to provide such criteria,
and defend the claim that they can support judgments of equivalence when theories
are combined.
Of course, to say that we can employ a judgment of equivalence in combining
theories does not mean that we must do so. And this, I claim, is precisely what
happens with the case of the simple harmonic oscillators. We have several theories
which are perfectly apt for equivalence—the equations in each case are the same in
form, differing only (let us suppose) in their choice of variables.49 The difference, then,
lies in how those theories are combined: if x is the position of the mass on the spring,
and I the current through the circuit, then in treating of both at once we certainly
cannot infer that I = 2 from x = 2—notwithstanding the fact that x and I play exactly
analogous roles in the two sets of equations.
Equivalence between theories is not the only inter-theoretic relation that is relevant
47I think of the research on categorical equivalence of theories (Weatherall (2015), Rosenstock et al.
(2015), Rosenstock and Weatherall (2016)) as exploring what the most general and abstract con-
straints on a notion of translation might be.
48See e.g. Maudlin (2007b)’s claim that one can have two versions of electromagnetism: one in which
charge density is primitive, and correlated by the laws with the divergence of the electric field; and
one in which charge density is defined as the divergence ofE. Hicks and Schaffer (2015) also discuss
the relationship between definability and non-fundamentality.
49Of course, in practice we often don’t have distinct variables: one typically uses ω, for instance, to
denote the angular frequency of whatever SHO system is under investigation, whether it be a
mass on a spring, an inductive circuit, or whatever. (This also illustrates that the same goes for
theoretical but natural-language terms such as “angular frequency”.) But this is no more a cause
for puzzlement than the existence of many bearers of the name “John” (or even “John Smith”).
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to the question of how theories ought to be combined. A thesis of reduction, for
instance, seeks to show how the terms of one theory may be identified with (perhaps
higher-level constructions from) those of another; whilst showing that one theory is a
limiting case of another is a matter of showing how the terms of one theorymay, upon
application of the appropriate limit, be identified with those of another. Again, the
virtue of doing so is that it permits cross-theoretical inferences of a certain kind. From
a series of statistical-mechanical claims, I can (given a reduction of thermodynamics
to statistical mechanics) infer certain thermodynamical claims; once I see the sense
in which Newtonian gravitation is a limiting case of General Relativity, I can import
or export data between (say) a general-relativistic model of the solar system, appro-
priate for determining motions near the sun, and a more computationally tractable
Newtonian model of the solar system, adequate for the motions further out. There
are more subtle relations as well: for example, one might use theoretical quantum
chemistry to predict reaction rates, which can then be fed into one’s chemistry theory
as parameters.
In the above examples, it is (we now think) obvious whether the terms of the one
theory should be identified with those of the other. But whether the terms of one
theory may be identified with those of another, and the concomitant issue of how the
two theories ought to be integrated with one another, is often a matter for substantive
scientific investigation. Think of Maxwell’s proposal that the notion of light (as
that term occurs in the theory of optics) ought to be identified with propagating
electromagnetic waves (understood via Maxwell’s own theory of the electromagnetic
field). Or, for a more contemporary example, consider black-hole thermodynamics.
Supposing one accepts that theory, then one will agree that there are quantities in the
relevant equations that play analogous roles to certain quantities in the equations of
“traditional” thermodynamics—but it is a further question whether the horizon area
(the analogue of entropy) ought to be identifiedwith thermodynamical entropywhen
the two theories are combined.
6 Theory meets world
I turn now to one final concern: just how, on this account, do theories come to
have empirical, physical content? For, one might feel, no matter how much careful
explication is done of a theory’s internal semantic architecture (and/or its relations to
other theories) it will remain marooned—cut off from contact with the world—unless
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we can provide it with appropriate referential links to that world.
The answer is to recognise a fiction in which we have been indulging for most
of this essay. Namely, we have supposed that the aspiring philosopher of science
finds themselves in the same boat as Quine’s intrepid field linguist:50 confronted by
a wholly unknown representational practice, and faced by the daunting task of how
that practice is to bemade intelligible, how it is (as the objection puts it) to be endowed
with physical or referential content. This picture is the final vestige of the externalist
viewpoint, and underpins their supposition that the task of the philosopher of science
is (like that of the linguist) to come up with an appropriate dictionary. So far, I’ve
discussed what could be done by the field linguist without translating the theory
into their home language—how (as it were) they could try to construct a grammar or
lexicon, rather than a dictionary, for the target language. Now, though, we should
drop the analogy altogether. We don’t begin our analysis of scientific theories by
taking somemysterious equations carved on stone tablets and puzzling out what they
might mean: theories are born as bearing all kinds of semantic or interpretational
relationships to our broader representational practice. So the interpretative task
which confronts us is not that of the field linguist, but that of the lexicologist: the
problem is not how to comprehend an alien practice, but how to fully understand a
practice which we already—at least to some extent—inhabit.
In particular, we do not begin our analysis with a multiplicity of isolated theories
and languages, but rather with a single theory. It is part of the task of science to
work out how parts of that theory can be parcelled up and separated off, in order to
better systematise the nature of our scientific knowledge. So austere calculi are not
the starting-point for scientific inquiry, but rather a result of it. It was a substantial
scientific achievement to get to the point where our understanding of the electro-
magnetic field was so well-encapsulated by a single set of equations that Hertz could
identify Maxwell’s theory with those equations. It is similarly part of the fruits of
scientific knowledge to equip us with a rich language for describing the results of
experiments, and to synthesise our empirical knowledge into what might be called an
“empirical theory” (relative to a given domain of theoretical inquiry).51 Having done
both of these tasks, we are then in a position to show how the austere theory and the
empirical theory can be successfully integrated, via the kinds of term-identifications
that I discussed in the previous section—or, as we say, to show how the theory is sup-
50See (Quine, 1960, chap. 2).
51cf. Suppes’ discussion of “the theory of the experiment” Suppes (1969), or Nagel’s notion of an
“experimental law” (Nagel, 1979, chap. 5).
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ported by evidence. Of course, it may be that no such integration can be successfully
performed. In that case, our only option is to reject or modify parts of our theoretical
framework until such consilience can be achieved.52
Note that this amounts to a kind of recovery of the external picture within the
internal approach: certain connections are postulated between the particular theory
at hand and an appropriate empirical theory for it, at least so far as possible. However,
there are (at least) two important differences. First, there is no a priori commitment to
a particular empirical theory as that to which all other theories must be related, nor
even to a particular form of language that the empirical theory must take. Second, the
relationship between a scientific theory and its empirical theory is just one instance
of a broader class of intertheoretic relations: there is not a principled difference (at
least at the level of semantics, rather than epistemology) between the relation of
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and the relation of theoretical chemistry to
summaries of lab experiments. Relatedly, the relationships between scientific theories
are not (necessarily) mediated by their respective relationships to some empirical
theory. By contrast, we saw that on the external view, questions about the relations
between a pair of scientific theories lose their autonomy; they just supervene on
questions about the relations those theories bear to the privileged language.
Now, all this leaves an important question unanswered: just what relationship, if
any, obtains between our unified (theoretical plus empirical) theory and “the world”.
However, it seems to me that addressing that question is not part of the purview
of philosophy of science. For it is a question that arises even prior to our engaging
in anything recognisably like science, with its distinctive problems and questions of
interpretation. Any kind of representational practice will, as a matter of course, raise
the question of how the representational apparatus relates to the entities represented.
Moreover, it is a question whose answer seems, for the most part, to float free of
anything tangibly related to the distinctive purposes of science. Once we have an
account of how a theory relates to our empirical theory, we are in a position to use
that theory to augment the empirical theory, and adjust our expectations of the future
(especially those related to the effects of specific kinds of intervention in the world)
appropriately. What more is added to our scientific practice by the assumption, or
52So, a theory being falsified is better described as our larger theory (the conjunction of the particular
theory with the empirical theory, together with appropriate bridging claims) turning out to be in-
consistent. This conception of truth in terms of consistency was defended by the early Reichenbach:
see (Reichenbach, 1965, chap. IV).
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the requirement, that the theory’s terms “genuinely refer”?53 To be clear, this is not
to claim that the question of realism (for it is he!) is not of philosophical importance.
It is just to deny that it is of specific importance to the philosophy of science, or that
it is most appropriately handled by the methods of philosophy of science—rather
than, say, metaphysics (in something more like the Kantian than the analytic sense,
i.e. as the inquiry into the relationship between the noumenal and the phenomenal)
or philosophy of language.
So what, then, are the problems of interpretation to which philosophy of science
is best addressed? Well, at the general level, there are the kinds of projects that I
have already canvassed in this essay. Are isomorphic models, or symmetry-related
models, representationally equivalent? What kind of relationship must hold between
the respective architectures of two theories, if they are to be meshed together via
equivalence or reduction? And in the philosophies of the special sciences, there are
also important questions of interpretation. Does general relativity admit of a coherent
notion of gravitational energy: that is, is there anything in general relativity which
may be identified with “energy” as it appears in other theories? What notion of
“species” is best used by biologists—or are there (as seems plausible) different ways
of unpacking such a notion, which are apt for different contexts? Such projects remain,
and keep their importance, on the internal approach. Itmay even be of value to use the
standard representationalist tools (reference, truth) to analyse such questions: e.g.,
to what in the theory of statistical mechanics might the term “temperature” refer?
Under what conditions, as described by general relativity, is Newtonian gravitation
approximately true? Only the detour through a single, privileged theory, or (what
comes to the same thing) via the world, is omitted—and I cannot see that philosophy
of science should regard that as a very great loss.
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